Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1957

Loa Johnson v. Elizabeth F. Syme : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Lee W. Hobbs; Attorney for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Johnson v. Syme, No. 8547 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2640

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

APPEAL No. 8547 ·

IN THE SUPRE'ME COURT

...........

of the

H

u

UN\VER~~TY UTA

STATE OF UTAH

ocT J . 1957

LOA JOHNSON,
··-Plaintiff and .Appellant,

-vs.ELIZABETH F. SYME, Adminis·ftatrix. of the E.state of Bailey Syme,
·'.

I

~eceased,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

LEE W. HOBBS
Attorney for Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ___________________________________________________ ··------- 1
STATEMENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------------------------------- 8
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLANT CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. ____________ 9
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT CONTRIBUTED AS A MAT·TER OF LAW TO
THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER
INJURIES. ---------------------------------------------------------- 14
POINT III. 'THE -COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING
THAT THE EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY
THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW TO RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT
FOR THE JURY AS TO ANY WILFUL
AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE
PART OF THE DECEDENT. -------------------------- 16
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23
.CASES
Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2nd 510, 109 Utah 60 _______________ ·-------Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. 2nd 350·---------------------------------·--------Martin v. Stevens, 243 Pac. 2nd 747----------------------------------- -------Poulsen v. Manness, 241 Pac. 2nd 152 ... ------------------------------------Spackman v. Carson, 216 Pac. 2nd 640 ________________________________________
State v. Anderson, 116 Pac. 2nd 398 .... ---------------------------------------State v. Barker, 196 Pac. 2nd, 723, 113 Utah 514 ____________________
State v. Lingman, 91 Pac. 2nd 457, 97 Utah 180 ________________________

9
15
10
15
11
21
19
18

TEXTS
5 Am. Jr., P. 882, Sec. 689 ... ·---------------·---------------------------------------- 13
4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice,
Part 2, Page 111, Section 261L _____________________________________________ 13
10 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, Part
I, Page 662, Section 6607 .... -------------------------·-------------------------- 16
STATUTES CITED
Section 41-6-45(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953____________

17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LOA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.ELIZABETH F. SYME, Administratrix of the Estate of Bailey Syme,
Deceased,

APPEAL
No. 8547

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The action giving rise to this appeal arose out of an
automobile collision occurring on October 8, 1954, at the
hour of 11 :00 P.M., at 13800 South State Street, said
South State Street being designated as U. S. Highway
91. At the point of collision a ro.ad, 13800 South, known
as the South Draper road, intersects with U.S. Highway
91. At this point Highway 91 is a four lane divided highway, being 2 lanes for northbound traffic and 2 lanes for
southbound traffic. The 2 inside lanes of Highway 91
are each 16 feet wide. The two outside lane'S of Highw.ay
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91 are each 24 feet wide. The dividing island or area
between the lanes for northbound and southbound traffic
is 35 feet wide, for a total highway width at this point
of 115 feet. The South Draper road runs in an easterly
direction from its intersection with U.S. Highway 91 to
the vicinity of Draper, Utah. The South Draper road
does not continue west of "C .S. Highway 91 as a public
highway, but makes a T intersection with U.S. Highway
91. A private road extends west from Highway 91 in a
direct continuing line with the South Draper road and
is a private road maintained by the Utah State Prison
as a patrol road. Neither Highway 91 nor the South
Draper road are artificially lighted in the area of this
intersection. Approximately 600 feet south of the intersection and on the east side of U.S. High·way 91 is a sign
one foot high and 3 feet high with the word "Draper" and
a small arrow pointing to the east. This was the only
sign or 1narker indicating to northbound traffic on Highway 91, the imminence of the intersection of the south
Draper road. Westbound traffic on the South Draper
road is controlled by a conventional stop sign located on
the north side of the South Draper road and approxilnat.ely 30 feet east of the edge of r .S. Highway 91.
The spe,ed limit along U.S. Highway 91 at the scene
of the accident is and was 50 1niles per hour. The stated
speed limit along the South Draper road is and was 35
Tniles per hour. The plaintiff and appellant, Loa Johnson, was driving a 1953 Buick Hoadnwster sedan north
along l T.S. I Iighway 91. The decedent, Bailey Syme, ·was
driving a 1953 Ford sedan west along the South Draper
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road. The two autornobiles collided at the intersection
of the ro.ads, the collision resulting in the death of Mr.
Syme and in personal injuries to the appellant, Mrs.
Johnson.
The appellant herein, Loa Johnson, thereafter commenced an action for personal injury against the respondent herein as Administratrix of the estate of the
decedent. The plaintiff in her complaint .alleged two
causes of action, the first cause of ac;tion alleging that
her injuries were a proximate result of the negligence
of the decedent. The plaintiff's second cause of action
alleged that her injuries were a proximate result of the
wilful .and wanton misconduct of the decedent. The de.fendant's answer denied the negligence of the decedent,
alleged the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and
appellant herein as a defense and also made counterclaim for damages resulting from the death of the
decedent.
The contpl.aint and counterclaim were sert: for jury
trial and on M·ay 5, 1956, a pretrial hearing was held
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett.
In the course of the pretrial proceedings, it was admitted by respective counsel that if the police officer
who investigated the accident, Highway Patrolman
Seddon, were called as a witness that he would testify
that he found the body of the decedent upon Highway 91
approximately 80 feet in a northwesterly direction from
the point of impaet from the two vehicles, and that the
decedent's body .at that time carried an odor of alcoholie
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beverage. In the course of the pretrial proceedings
counsel for the plaintiff stated that he intended to call
as witnesses the following:
1. .Mr. 0. F. St,anley of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff's counsel stated that :.Mr. Stanley would testify
that at about 11:00 o'clock P.M. on October 8, 1954, he
was a passenger in a car driven by Harry Jones traveling north on l!.S. Highway 91 near the Utah State Prison
at the point of the rnountain, and that he sat in the center
of the front seat of Mr. Jones' automobile. That he would
testify that he was traveling at about 50 miles per hour
and that as he neared the Draper road he noticed the
head lights of a car which was westbound. Further, that
i\Ir. Stanley would testify that he was about three-fourths
of a block away from the intersection when he first saw
the westbound car. That he would estimate the speed
of the westbound ear in the neighborhood of 40 miles per
hour and was about 300 feet of the intersection when he
was first seen by :Mr. Stanley. That the westbound car
continued through the intersection without stopping for
the stop sign and collided with another northbound car.
~Ir. Stanley would testify that he had not seen the northbound car until after the impact.

2. ~fr. Marvin Taylor of S.alt Lake City, Utah.
Cotmsel for the plaintiff stated that ~Ir. Taylor would
testify that he was occupying the aut01nobile of ~Ir.
If arr~T \V. Jones and was sitting on the right side of the
front se~at, beside ~r r. Stanley. That they were traveling
a.pproxinmtcly 50 1niles per hour and were staying ap-
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proximately a block behind another northbound ear which
was proceeding at approximately the smne speed as the
car in which he was riding. That as they were traveling
north on F.S. Highway 91 ne.ar the State Prison ~fr.
Stanley who was sitting to the left of Mr. Taylor suddenly called the attention of the people in the Jones' automobile to a westbound car on a side road. That the
westbound car was almost to the intersection when Mr.
Taylor first observed it. That l\1r. Taylor obseTved the
automobile come through the stop sign without stopping
or slowing down .and saw the westbound automobile collide with the northbound automobile which was ahead of
l\1r. Jones' automobile. r_rhat Mr. Taylor would testify
that he could not estimate the spe.ed of the westbound
car but that he did observe that the westbound car did
not stop or slow down for the stop sign.
1

3. Harry W. Jones of Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff's counsel stated Jones was driving his automobile north on U.S. Highway 91 near the Utah State
Prison and that :Mr. 0. F. Stanley and Mr. ~farvin
Taylor weTe sitting in the front seat beside him. That he
was traveling about 45 miles per hour in the outside lane
of northbound traffic .and that he noticed the tail lights
on a car approximately a block in front of him which
he would estiinate was traveling at approximately the
same speed as his own automobile. That he suddenly
observed a grey ear swinging around in ,a circle and that
he had not observed the westbound automobile until he
saw a cloud of dust and the car swinging around. That
Mr. Jones would testify that he did not actually remem-
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ber seeing the impact and was not sure of details because
he was very intenJt on his driving. At this time it was
admitted and agreed by respective counsel that the testiInony of the witnesses as proposed by the plaintiff's
counsel could not be contradicted at that time by any
other wirtnesses known to the defendant. (Pretrial Trans.
Page 3, line 28, to Page 5, line 5, incl.) At this stage of
the pretrial hearing the counsel for the plaintiff moved
that the counterclaim of the defendant be dismissed on
the grounds that all of the evidence would indicate that
the decedent had been negligent as a matter of law and
that such negligence had been the cause or in any event
had contributed to his death. This motion to dismiss was
granted by the cour.t.
Thereupon on motion of counsel for the defendant,
the deposition of the plaintiff, the appellant herein, ,,~as
published. The testimony of the plaintiff as it appeared
in the deposition disclosed that she had been visiting
friends in Provo, litah, and had left there about 10 :30
or quarter to 11:00 (Page 9, line 6). That she proceeded
north on U.S. Highway 91 from Provo to Salt Lake (Page
9) that at the time of the collision it had been raining but
had stopped and that the roads were wet (Page 10, lines
3, 4, 5) ; that she was watching the road straight ahead
with her lights on diln because of approaching traffic
(Page 12line 25) when she saw the automobile belonging
to the deeedent. When asked how far she was from the
decedent's automobile when she first saw him, she first
::;tated (Page 13, line 16) :
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"A.

vVell I can't judge on feet; I couldn't tell
you; how many feet would your dim lightf:
show~

Q.

vVell, let's say, this how about car lengths?
A car is pretty close to 20 feet long, 18 to 20
feet.

A.

Well it was 20 to 30 feet I guess before I seen
him.

Q.

You would estimate then that it would be a
little bit more than one car length and less
than two car lengths~

A.

Oh I think it would be probably, yes, about
that.''

The plaintiff further stated that she estimated the speed
of the defendant at the time she first saw hirn as ten or
twenty miles per hour (Page 14, line 24). The plaintiff
further testified that the first time she saw the decedent's
automobile was when her car lights firs1t picked it up
on the road (Page 16, line 13) and that prior to that
time she was watching the road str.aight ahead of her
(Page 16, line 18; page 17, line 9 and 10; page 17, line
19 and 20, 21 and 22). The plaintiff testified that linmediately from the time she had left Provo to the point
of the collision she had been traveling at approximately
50 miles per hour and not to exceed 55 (Page 11, line
6 and 7).
Thereupon counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff on the basis of the
proposed testimony and on the basis of the te,stimony of
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the plaintiff as appeared by her deposition. The court
thereupon ruled:
1. That the eonduct of the plaintiff constituted
negligence as a matter of law.
2. That the negligence of the plaintiff contributed
as a matter of law to the proximate cause of her injuries,
and
3. That the evidence proposed by the plaintiff was
insufficient as a matter of law to raise a question of fact
for the jury as to any wilful and wanton misconduct on
the part of the decedent. The court thereupon dismissed
the first and second causes of action of the plaintiff's
complaint.
From the findings of the court, first, that plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
second, that such contributory negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries as a matter of law and, third,
that the evidence proposed by the plaintiff w.as insufficient as a matter of law to raise a question of fact for
the jury as to any wilful and wanton misconduct on the
part of the decedent and from the consequent dismissal
of plaintiff's first and second causes of action, the plaintiff takes this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT ·CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
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POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THAT
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
CONTRIBUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES.

POINT III
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT THE
EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY AS TO ANY
WILFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF
THE DECEDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT ·CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The court indicated in the pre-trial proceeding's that
his finding that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a n1atter of law was based on the fact that
the plaintiff did not see the defendant until immediately
before the cvash (Pretrial Tr., Page 6, lines 5 to 8).
This court has heretofore held that the questions of
negligence in failing to observe an approaching automobile at an intersection is one of fact for the jury. In the
case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2nd 510, 109 Utah 60,
a case involving a fact situation almost identical to the
instant case, this court stated at Page 512:
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"As to what the circumstances were at the
time the plaintiff entered the intersection, and as
to whether entering under such circumstances was
an act from which persons of ordinary prudence
and caution would have foreseen some injury
would likely result, are matters upon which
reasonable minds may differ. As such they are
properly for the jury."
Discussing the failure of the plaintiff to observe the approach of the defendant's vehicle, the court stated at
Page 512:
"But does it follow as beyond dispute that had
the plaintiff looked and seen the ambulance approaching, reasonable and prudent conduct would
have dictated ·that he stop until the ambulance
had crossed the intersection. Are the facts revealed by the evidence so clear and certain that
the court could say that for plaintiff to drive into
the intersection without stopping was not the act
of an ordinarily prudent and careful man."
In the case of Jlat·fin v. Sterens, 243 Pac. 2nd 747, a
case in which the plaintiff entered an open intersection
at 18th East and Stratford Streets in Salt Lake City, the
plaintiff entering the intersection from the north along
18th East Street and the defendant proceeding west
along Stratford A venue, the trial court held that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 1natter
of law in failing to observe the defendant's automobile
in time to avoid the eollision. This court, in discussing
the duty of the plaintiff to exercise due care, states at
Page 750:
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"But in doing so he had the right to assume,
and to rely on the assumption that others would
do likewise."
The court holding the defendant's negligence to be a
question of fact for the jury, reversed the decision of the
trial court and remanded the cause for trial. See also
S1Jackman v. Carson, 216 Pac. 2nd 640:
"Unless all reasonable minds must say that
a party did not use due care under a particular
set of eircumstaces, it is a question for the jury."
In this case the plaintiff driving ,a motorcycle on a
country road at approximately 45 miles an hour observed
the defendant's truck parked on the side of the road approximately 200 feet ahead of him. His testimony was
that he next saw the truck pulling in front of him when
he was approximately 30 feet away, that he ,applied his
brakes and was unable to avoid the collision. The court
observing that the plaintiff had not been alerted to any
immediate danger by his first observation of the truck
and there being no indication to the plaintiff that it was
about to be moved into his path observes at Page 642:
"Under these circumstances we are convinced
that the issue of whether the p}aintiff was negligent in failing to keep a more diligent lookout
ahead was properly submit,ted to the jury."

It is the contention of the appellant that her position
immediately preceding the collision was identical to that
of the plaintiff in the Spackman case, in that had she
observed the decedent's automobile a;t any time prior to
his entering the intersection she would have had no indi-
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cation that the decedent was about to proceed through the
stop sign without slowing down or stopping.
The further issue of the plaintiff's speed at the time
of the collision was also raised as an issue by the counsel for defendant at the pretrial hearing (Pretrial Transcript, Page 2, lines 13 to 17 inclusive). However, the trial
court made no indication that its ruling was b.ased in any
way on the plaintiff's rate of speed. In any event, the
speed of the plaintiff at the time of the collision was
never stated by her in her deposition nor was this question asked her by defendant's counsel. The only reference to her speed in the deposition was in answer to the
question (deposition, p.age 11, line 4) :

"Q. About how fast had you been traveling from
the time you left Provo ~
Oh approxinl'ately 50, or-to my knowledge,
it was between 50, and-I don't think I got
ove·r 55."
The only evidence proposed as to speed at the pretrial hearing was the proposed testi1nony of ~Ir. ~Iarvin
Taylor, a passenger in the car following the plaintiff's
automobile, whose proposed testimony would indicate
that he was in an auton1obile traveling approximately
50 miles per hour, and that the car in front of them (the
plaintiff) was traveling at approxi1nately the same speed,
and the proposed testnnony of l\Ir. Harry \V. Jones, who
was the driver of the auton1obile following the plaintiff
and in which 1\la.rvin Taylor was a passenger, whose
proposed te~timony \Yonld indicate his speed to be about
45 miles per hour, and that the rar in front of him, the

A.
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plaintiff, was traveling at approximately the same speed.
rrherefore the appellant submits that there is no evidence
of excessive speed, or at the most a possible question of
fact for a jury. See 5 American Jur. 882, Sec. 689, where
it is stated:
" . . it is generally for the jury to decide
whether ... such speed was excessive, considering
in connection therewith the hazards of the surrounding circumstances.''
See also, Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law &
Practice, Part 2, Page 111, Seetion 2611, reading as
follows:
"It is usually a question for the jury whether
an excessive rate of speed is a contributing cause
of an accident. ... "
:See also the case of Poulsen v. Manness, 241 Pac. 2nd
152, wherein this court held that the issue of contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff was properly submitted to the jury.

Appellant respectfully submits that ther.e is no evidence in the proceedings had in the pretrial hearing
before the trial court in this matter which will support
the ruling of the trial court that the plaintiff and appellant herein was guilty of contributory negligence as ,a
matter of law.
POINT II
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS HOLDING THA'T
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT
CONTRIBUTED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES.
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ARGUMENT
Assuming for the purpose of this argument that the
plaintiff and appellant is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to see the approach
of the decedent's automobile and in traveling at an excessive speed, it is the position of the plaintiff and appellant that in this event the question as to whether such
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and of
the consequent injuries to the appellant is properly a
question of fact for the jury.
In the case of Hess v. Robinson, 163 Pac. 2nd 510,
109 U t.ah 60, the plaintiff was traveling on a through
street and was struck by the defendant's automobile when
the defendant ran a stop sign. The facts of the Hess
case are almost identical with the facts of the instant
case in that both cases the respective plaintiffs failed to
see the defendant vehicle approaching the stop sign. In
the Hess 0ase this court held that, even assun1ing the
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, the question of
proximate cause was properly one for the jury. Quoting
the opinion of the court at Page 512:
"But does it follow as beyond dispute that
had the plaintiff looked and seen the ambulanc~
approaching, reasonable and prudent conduct
would have dictated that he stop until the ambulance had crossed the intersection. Are the facts
revealed by the evidence so clear and certain that
the court oould sa~~ that for plaintiff to drive into
the intersection without stopping was not the act
of .an ordinarii~· prudent and careful n1an.'·
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[n the case of lvlartin L'. Stevens, 243 Pac. 2nd 747,
involving a collision of two automobiles at an uncontrolled intersection, after discussing the proposition that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law and after determining that he was not, the
court stated at Page 753:
"There is also the question of proximate
cause. Should we assume that all reasonable men
must conclude that plaintiff's failure to keep more
of a lookout to the east amounted to negligence,
would they .also all agree that such failure to observe proximately caused the collision. Suppose
he had looked continuously to the east as he approached and proceeded into the intersection and
had seen defendant coming. Could he not, within
the limits of reasonable care, have assumed defendant would slow up and yield the right of w:ay,
or would the defendant's speed and proximity to
the intersection have been a warning to the plaintiff that he would nort do so. Under the rulings in
Hess v. Robinson, Lowder v. Holley, and Poulsen
v. Manness, this was also a jury question."
See also Lowder v. Holley, 233 Pac. 2nd 350.
See also Poulsen v.

~Ianness,

241 Pac. 2nd 152,

wherein this court ruling that the issues of negligence
and proximate cause were properly for the jury

s~tated:

"Another way of stating it is that a motorist
driving on a fast arte·ri.al highway need not treat
every country lane or relatively minor side road
as an interseetion. He has the right of way for a
much gre,ater distance."
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See also 5 A1nerican Jurisprudence, Page 882, Seetion 689, wherein the court stated:
" ... it is generally for the jury to decide
whether the speed of the vehicle proximately contributed to the accident. . . ."
See also 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law & P~actice, Part I, Page 662, Section 6607, where
it is stated :
''Speed in excess of that permitted by statute,
ordinance, or other traffic regulation may constitute negligence per se; nevertheless there is
still a jury question as to whether or not such violation was the proximate cause of the injury or
damage complained of."
Appellant submits that under all of the facts and
circumstances shown or indicated in the pretrial proceedings in this cause, that the question of the proximate
cause or causes of the collision of the appellant's automobile with that of the decedent is properly a question
of fact to be detennined by the jury.

POINT III
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT THE
EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY THE PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY AS TO ANY
WILFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF
THE DECEDENT.

The evidence of the plaintiff as proposed at the
pre,trial hearing, if sub1nitted to a jury, would support
a finding h)' the jury that the decedent approached an
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arterial highway along a small side road at a speed of
about 40 1nile,s per hour, and that the decedent drove
directly through the stop sign and on to the highway
without stopping or slowing down and directly into the
path of the plaintiff. The jury might also find from the
testimony of the investigating officer that the decedent
had partaken of alcoholic beverages sometime prior to
the collision. It is the contention of the appellant that
should a jury so find, they might also find that such conduct on the part of the decedent constituted wilful and
wanton misconduct and further that such wilful and
wanton 1nisconduct was the proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff.
The crime of reckless driving is defined at Utah
Code Annortated 1953 Section 41-6-45(a) as follows:
•'Any pHrson who drives any vehicle in wilful
or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property is guilty of reckless driving."
~.,or

the purpose of this argument, the appellant submits to the court a hypothetical situation identieal to the
.actual situation in the instant case, except that we will
ask the court to assume that 1\frs. Johnson, the plaintiff
and appellant herein, had been killed as a result of the
collision and that Bailey Syme, the decedent herein, had
survived the collision and had been prosecuted for manslaughter. That this evidence, had it been presented
against Bailey Syme, in the course of a prosecution for
manslaughter, would sustain his conviction by a jury
appears from the reasoning of this court in the following
previous decisions.
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In the case of State v. Lingman) 91 Pac. 2nd, 457, 97
Utah 180, the defendant w.as convicted of the crime of
involuntary mansl,aughter based on an automobile collision occurring September 29, 1937, at the intersection of
21st South Street and 2nd West Street, when the defendant's car going north on 2nd West Street collided with
ear driven west on 21st South Street, by the decedent.
The defendant was charged at driving at .a speed in excess of 40 miles an hour which speed was dangerous and
excessive in view of the width and obstructions of the
said driver's view along the said highway and the hazard
of the inte·rsection hereinbefore mentioned. The jury
was also instructed that failure to yield the right of way
could be the unlawful act not amounting to a felony to
support the conviction. Because of an erroneous instruction by the court with reference to a municipal speed
ordinance the cause was remanded for new trial, the court
holding that under proper instruction the evidence was
sufficient to raise .a question for the jury. The court
states at Page 198:
"We think the unlawful ac.t that is the infraction must be done in such a Inanner as to more
than constitute a 1nere thoughtless omission or
slight deviation from the norm of prudent conduct. It must be reckless or in 1narked disregard
to the s:afety of others. When it does that it
passes the stage of nwre 1nalum prohibitum and
approaches the unsocial aspects of n1alum in se."
Again quoting fr01n Page 200 :

" . .A.nd if such act totally prohibited is done
recklessly or with Inarked disregard for the safety
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of others, it will be done with criminal negligence
and if dea:th results will sustain a charge of manslaughter under arm A."
Again quoting from Page 201 :
"Paradoxically the lawful act of driving in .an
unlawful manner is an unlawful act, hence if done
with recklessne.ss or with marked disregard for
the safety of others, it may as well be considered
as falling under arm A and of course if the .act
is fraught with danger to life and done in an unlawful manner, it could hardly be nther than done
recklessly." Arm A being "An unlawful act not
amounting to a felony."
Quoting from page 204 :
"In consequence the instruction of the court
on this question in this case may be substantially
as follows: If the jury finds that Mrs. Layton was
killed by the impacl and that the impact was
caused by the driving of the defendant in a reckless 1nanner or for marked disregard for the
safety of o·thers, as charged in the information,
then such driving being unlawful and in violation
of the provisions of Title 57 as set out, would
sustain a conviclion of manslaughter."
In ·this case there was no evidence of intoxicrution on the
part of the defendant.
The case of the State· v. Lingman w.as cited and
approved in the case of State v. Barker, 196 Pac. 2nd,
723, 113 Utah 514. In this case the defendant was found
guilty of involuntary manslaughter re·sulting from an
automobile collision at 33rd South .and 23rd East Streets,
Salt Lake County. The defendant was driving north on
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23rd East Street and the decedent was riding in another
automobile traveling east on 33rd South Street. 33rd
South Street is a through highway and there are stop
signs against the traffic entering 33rd South from the
north and south on 23rd East Street. The evidence indicated that the defendant saw the stop sign when he was
75 to 100 yards from it, and at that time he was traveling
from 30 to 35 miles per hour. He testified that he slowed
his car nearly to a stop and shifted into an intermediate
gear and began to pick up speed when he came even with
the stop sign. He then stated that he saw the lights of
the other car approaching from the west and applied
his brakes but was unable to stop. On appeal the defendant contended that the evidence was not sufficient to
sustain the conviction and second that the court had
committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury. The
court, holding that certain instructions had been erroneous, remanded the cause for a new trial. The court in
denying the .argument of the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a eonviction stated as
follows at Page 526:
"The faet that he (the defendant) entered
this intersection at a time when another ear was
approaching so near as to constitute an iimnediate hazard made it highly dangerous to the occupants of that ear regardless of whether he came
to a eomplete stop, or 1nerely slowed down or
drove through without even slowing down.. ,
Again quoting:
"If under these eircun1stanees his failure to
yield was the result of inattention on his part or
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because of his failure to observe and see in time
that there was a car approaching on the intersecting highway, or if he saw the approaching car
in time to yield the right of way and failed to do
so, then the jury from those f.aets would be justified in finding that he was guilty of conduct which
was reckless or in marked disregard for the
safety of others. That inattention to the traffic
and other persons on the highway which results in
a driver's failure to avoid great danger and injury
to others who are on the highway, has been repeatedly held by this court to constitute recklessness and to justify a verdict of manslaughter."
Quoting again:
"The evidence was sufficient to justify the
court in submitting the case to the jury, but on
account of the erroneous instructions, the case is
reversed and remanded for a new trial."
In the case of State v. Anderson, 116 Pac. 2nd 398.
The defendant Anderson was convicted of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter arising out of an automobile
collision at 21st South and 3rd East Streets in Salt Lake
City. The defendant was proceeding northward on 3rd
E.ast Street. The decedent was traveling westward on
21st South Street, a through highway. On the southeast
corner of the intersection and facing south was the usual
state highway stop sign. The evidence was uncontroverted that the defendant did not stop at the stop sign.
He stated he did not know there was a stop sign there
until he saw it. That he applied his hr.akes and tried to
stop, but skidded into the other car. The evidence was
that the defendant entered the intersection at a speed
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of between 40 and 45 miles an hour. The court, discussing the sufficiency of the evidence, stated at Page 401:
"We need not enter into a discussion of these
matters, it would add much detail to do so and
might not be helpful. The instructions, objectionable as they are, nevertheless covered the issues
and the evidence. Under the evidence the jury was
justified in finding the verdict of guilty."
Appellant submits that if such evidence will support
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter with the attendant burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the same evidence will support a finding in a civil action
and particularly in the instant case of wilful and wanton
misconduct on the part of Bailey Syme. Each of the
cases cited is almost identical to the conduct of the decedent, Bailey Syme, in this case. That a jury might
find the decedent herein acted recklessly would seem to
follow. As stated by this court in the Lingman case:
". . . and of course if the act is fraught with
danger to life and done in an unlawful manner, it
could hardly be other than done recklessly."
From the statute defining reckless driving as driving
with "wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of
others" appellant sub1nits to the court that the conclusion must follow that a jury in the case now before this
court might well find in favor of the plaintiff and appellant on her Second Cause of Action, and that such a finding would properly be within the province of the finder
of fact.
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CONCLUSION
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the order
of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's First Cause of
Action and the order of the lower court dismissing plaintiff's Second Cause of Aetion should each be reversed
and that both causes of action of plaintiff's complaint
should be remanded for jury trial.

Respectfully submitted,
LEE W. HOBBS
Attorney for Appellant
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